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Abstract
In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i)
inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together
with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost ad-
vantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to
the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional
dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant
for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places.
JEL codes: C73, D72, D74
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1 Introduction
By knocking down the present “king of the hill”, the winner can take the king’s
place and enjoy both the prestige and the fighting advantage that standing on the
top of the hill entail. Many real power struggles are positional just like this -
incumbents versus challengers, insiders versus outsiders, market leaders vs followers
- but the structure is often less symmetric than the childrens game suggests. Usually
contestants have different abilities to take advantage of incumbency. Some winners
- in battlefields, politics, or market places - receive an even stronger position than
their predecessors. They become the king, not just of a hill, but maybe of a whole
mountain – raising the prestige of the position and making it even more difficult to
overthrow them as the competition continues. Other winners hardly get a mound
to start out from in the next period.
Below we explore such positional dynamics where fighting for power is both over
rents and over positions and fighting edge in the subsequent fights. Like Esteban
and Ray (1999) we focus on a situation where there is no collective decision rule and
where groups with opposed interests are willing to spend resources to increase the
chance of obtaining their preferred outcome. Unlike most other papers, however,
we focus on alternating powers in lasting conflicts. While the immediate rent of a
contestant is the difference in utilities between his own favored policy and that of his
opponents, the advantages in future battles are captured by differences in the unit
cost of influence. The effective prize of winning a battle contains both an immediate
rent and the value of the incumbency cost advantage and will generally be different
for the two groups.
We address three questions:
1. Inequality. Does leveling of the battlefield maximize conflict efforts?
2. Turnover. Do circumstances that lead to higher fighting intensities imply lower
regime stability?
3. Power. Is more power always to the advantage of the powerful?
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Applying traditional static contest models one would be lead to insist on an
unambiguous yes to all three questions.1 We show that these conclusions do not
carry over to contests with positional dynamics.
The differences have clear policy implications. If the results from static contest
models capture the essence of most conflicts, policies to reduce fighting and stabilize
regimes should provide resources to the incumbent to deter the opposition from
fighting. Such interventions are far from successful in all cases. Nato’s intervention in
Afghanistan after 2001 and Ethiopa’s intervention in Somalia in 2006, demonstrate
that a strengthening of the incumbent can be met by more fighting by the challengers
– the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia.2
The word ”feud” - a state of prolonged mutual hostility, typically between two
families, clans or communities - captures the essential aspects of the conflicts that
we are considering. European history has many examples. One old but promi-
nent example is the struggle between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the two
opposing factions in German and Italian politics in the 13th and 14th centuries.3
1Regarding 1), in static contest models, an edge to one player raises his chances of winning and
induces the opponent to fight less. This reduction in the efforts of the opponent leads the more
powerful to spend less in the conflict as well. Thus in static models, inequality of power dampens
the struggle. The level of resources wasted in the fighting relative to the total prizes at stake is
highest when the contestants are equally strong and fight for the same prize. Regarding 2), the
average turnover must be highest when the chances of winning is fifty-fifty, implying that a leveling
of the battlefield raises the rate of regime turnover. Thus, more fighting goes together with lower
regime stability. Regarding 3), as long as the prizes are given independently of fighting efforts the
powerful is bound to gain as he is more likely to obtain the prize for less effort. (For a review of
models of static rent-seeking contests, see Nitzan 1994)
2Somalia is a particularly instructive case of lasting power struggles. Since the disintegration
of the central government in 1991, the country has been wracked by internal clan warfare and a
struggle with the Islamic movement. In June 2006, after months of fighting between Mogadishu’s
US-backed militia leaders and the Union of Islamic Courts, the Transitional Federal Government
lost its power as the islamists took control of the capital city and appointed a hard-line Islamic
leader to head its new legislature. With significant Ethiopian support, the Transitional Federal
Government regained Mogadishu on 28 December 2006. Since then, the fighting has just escalated.
The extra edge that the Ethiopian support provided, did far from deterr the fighting by the Islamic
movement. In contrast to what static conflict models would predict, the extra incumbency edge
induced harder opposition.
3The feuds consisted of a long series of battles over the control of cities like Bergamo, Ferrara,
Florence, Lucca, Milan, Padua, Parma, Piacenza, Treviso, Verona and Vicenza. In each battle,
the faction in power had a clear advantage over the challenger and the losing party was often
exiled from the city. The two parties had diverging economic interests. The Guelphs were middle
class merchants, artisans and burgers, the Ghibellines were landed aristocrats - implying that
their opportunity costs of fighting were quite unequal. Once in power, each party favored different
policies that the opposing party strongly disliked. The Guelphs favored mercantile liberties of urban
communes and fought for the pope and against the Emperor’s encroachment. The Ghibellines
2
Latin-America has similarly experienced repeated incumbency shifts in lasting power
struggles between non-autocratic and autocratic rule. Argentina, for instance, had
four episodes of moving into autocracy plus four episodes of moving out of autoc-
racy from 1950 to 1990, Honduras and Bolivia had three plus three, while several
others had two plus two (Przeworski et al. 1990). The incumbency advantages that
the two types of regimes enjoyed was dramatically unequal. While authoritarian
regimes had more support from the military, less authoritarian regimes had more
legitimacy and more popular support.
An approach that incorporates unequal stakes and advantages with endogenous
turnover of power positions is more in line with these observations. A sharper
incumbency edge for one side may not only imply that this incumbency becomes
more valuable, but also that the position of the challenger becomes worse. Thus,
since the gain of winning is the value of not loosing, the stakes may go up for both the
incumbent and the challenger, implying that the fighting intensity may go up when
the strength of each side becomes more unequal. The long lasting consequences of
present struggles are what distinguishes dynamic contests from static ones.
The unequal stakes may reflect differences in the supporting groups and in the
access to resources. The immediate rents to a party in power may vary with ideo-
logical orientations, political capabilities and economic opportunities. Advantages
in future contests may reflect varying capabilities to utilize incumbency to raise
campaign contributions or, in more violent struggles, varying sympathies from the
army, the police and from other parts of the state apparatus.
Fighting in the shadow of future conflicts implies that the relationships between
resources spent and expected turnover of incumbents, and between power and pay-
off can be less straight forward than the static models predict. Incorporating a
simple but essential dynamic element, sheds new light on how conflicts affect political
instability and how strength affects pay-offs.
were traditionalists who fought against the temporal power of the pope. Dante Alighieri, himself
a Gulph cavalryman, gives a poetic account of the reoccurring fights in the book Inferno in his
Divine Comedy (Dante 2000).
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The struggles can be over the control of natural resources (a diamond mine); over
political representation; or over religion (sharia laws). The issues can be political,
economic or institutional: colonial rule versus independence; democratic versus one
party rule. The simple dynamics we incorporate do not exclude that the victory of
one side can become an absorbing state while the struggling continues as long as the
present incumbent is undefeated. In the bitter fighting struggles in South-Africa,
for instance, the stakes for the apartheid regime were to prevent a permanent loss
of their privileges. For the ANC, however, winning implied that the hated system
was gone forever.
Our stylized set-up may also have other interpretations, such as patent races and
competition over technological leadership. A case in point is the contest over mobile
phone designs between Nokia and Sony-Ericsson, where winning the consumers over
in one round implies a technological leadership that can help in future contests as
well.
We build on an expanding literature where conflicts are seen as rent seeking con-
tests, see Trygve Haavelmo (1954), Gordon Tullock (1980), Jack Hirschleifer (1991),
Herschel Grossman (1994), Stergios Skaperdas (1992), Kai Konrad and Stergios
Skaperdas (1998) and Derek Clark and Christian Riis (1998). We are also inspired
by Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson’s work (2001 and 2006) on political transition
and elites. The three papers closest to ours are the contributions by Joan Esteban
and Debraj Ray (1999), by William Rogerson (1982), and by Stergios Skaperdas and
Constantinos Syropoulos (1996). While Esteban and Ray construct a general model
of multi group conflicts with heterogenous prizes, Skaperdas and Syropoulos consider
the problem of achieving cooperation when an early victory to one group improves
the groups position in subsequent periods. The somewhat overlooked contribution
by Rogerson (1982) focuses on insiders and outsiders in a symmetric lobbying game
over a homogenous prize where a winning outsider becomes the new insider. We go
beyond Rogerson, however, by focusing on an asymmetric cost structure, an asym-
metric equilibria, and by incorporating a more general contest success function.
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2 Contests with incumbency advantages
An incumbent and a challenger compete for power and use force to improve their
chances of winning. We derive how the stakes at play depend i) on the polarization
of preferences and ii) on the cost structure of the contestants.
There are two possible fighting constellations: the first with a as the incumbent
and b as the challenger; the other with b as the incumbent and a as the challenger.
The simple dynamics that we incorporate is the endogenous switches between the
two fighting constellations: when a loses we move to the constellation where b is the
incumbent, and so on. The probability of winning is positively related to the use of
force in the contest. More specifically we define relative force Si of an incumbent as
Si =
force of i
total force of a and b
(1)
Throughout we use the convention that capital letters reflect incumbency position
and lower case letters reflect a challenger position, such that
Sa + sb = 1 and sa + Sb = 1 (2)
This contest has many similarities to Cournot duopoly competition. In this analogy
the parallel to ”force of i” is supply of commodities from i while the parallel to Si
is the market share of i.
The antagonism between the two contestants is captured by the immediate con-
sequences of being in power. When a is in power he implements his optimal incum-
bency behavior without commitment. This choice is valued as Ua for the incumbent
a and as ub for the challenger b. Thus the value of Ua reflects a’s evaluation of
a’s own choice as incumbent while ua reflects a’s evaluation of the choice of b as
incumbent. The difference between the two, Da, is a’s immediate gain of assuming
5
a incumbent and b challenger a challenger and b incumbent
Figure 1: Example of the two fighting constellations
power - his incumbency rent. Similarly Db is b’s incumbency gain.
4
Da= [Ua − ua] (3)
Db= [Ub − ub] (4)
The second aspect of the conflict concerns the contestants’ ability to take power
and remain in power. We assume that for each contestant, incumbency implies a cost
advantage in the sense that the unit cost of the use of force is lower as incumbent
than as challenger. This cost advantage yields an advantage over and above the
immediate rent of being in power. In Figure 1 we have illustrated one example of
the difference in incumbency advantage and the difference in incumbency rent in
the two fighting constellations. The incumbency advantages are illustrated by the
heights of the hill, while the size of the per period rent Da and Db is illustrated by
the size of the purse. Thus, the figure illustrates the case where a (the white) has a
strong incumbency advantage and collects a modest rent, while b (the black) has a
smaller incumbency advantage but collects a higher rent.
For each contestant the immediate rent (of assuming power) plus the evaluation
of the cost advantage (of being in power) constitute the prize that he fights for.
These total prizes are denoted Fa and Fb.
Due to the competition, the contestants can never collect the whole of these
4In a multi-group context, Esteban and Ray (1999) use utility differences like these as an
indication of intergroup distance. The value of [Ua − ua] measures the distance from group a to
group b, the value of [Ub − ub] the distance from b to a. The larger these measures, the more
antagonism there is between groups and the more polarized are the preferences.
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prizes for free. For ease of exposition we first consider the case where the net rate
of return for the contestants are known parameters H (for incumbents) and h (for
challengers). Hence,
net return for incumbent=HiFi (5)
net return for challenger=hiFi (6)
Consider contestant a. If he wins, he starts the next contest as the incumbent
and anticipates a net return equal to HaFa. If he loses he starts the next contest as
the challenger with an anticipated return equal to haFa. The difference [Ha − ha]Fa
is the valuation of the cost advantage and equals the net gain from starting out as
an incumbent rather than as a challenger. When adding the immediate rent Da, we
find the prizes from winning. Including a time index t and a discount factor δ < 1,
for both contestants we have
Fa,t=Da + δ [Ha,t+1 − ha,t+1]Fa,t+1 (7)
Fb,t=Db + δ [Hb,t+1 − hb,t+1]Fb,t+1 (8)
In the remainder of the paper we focus on stationary equilibria. In the appendix
we discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria and of non stationarity. Solving (7)
and (8) it follows that in a stationary equilibrium.
Fa=
Da
1− δ [Ha − ha] ≥ Da (9)
Fb=
Db
1− δ [Hb − hb] ≥ Db (10)
The contestants prizes differ in two dimensions: i) they fight for different incumbency
rents Di = Ui − ui and ii) the rents are enjoyed for different expected length and
comes at different costs.
Clearly, the higher the antagonism between the two, the higher the prizes they
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are fighting for. Each of the two prizes also depends on the incumbency power of
both contestants. The valuation of incumbency (Hi − hi) will be substantial if i-s
incumbency position is strong (Hi large) or if i-s challenger position is weak (hi
small). As we will prove below, an incumbency advantage to at least one of the
contestants implies that the evaluation of incumbency is strictly positive for both.
The intuition is simple: if a has a strong incumbency advantage, then Ha is large;
but if Ha is large then hb is small. Or to put it differently: the gain of winning is
the value of not losing.
The stakes of a contestant may be high because his incumbency benefits are
high, or because his challenger benefits are low. The stakes may also be high be-
cause incumbency is expected to last, implying that the contestant can either, for
a long period, enjoy the incumbency benefits or be squeezed as a challenger. A
weak challenger can therefore fight hard for an advantageous incumbency position
in future battles, or he can fight hard to eliminate the harmful consequences of a
strong incumbent of today. In other words, a contestant may put in a lot of effort
either because winning enables him to remain in power, or because winning prevents
the opponents from an advantageous incumbency. To prevent the opponent from
utilizing its insider edge can be equally important as to utilize it for oneself.
2.1 Micro motives
In this section we derive the contest efforts and net returns as a perfect Markov
equilibrium. We assume that winning the contest requires the relative force, S, to
be larger than an uncertain threshold - analogous to probabilistic voting models.
Hence, we write the probability of winning as
probability of winning = Ψ (S)
In this generalization of the Tullock contest success function the probability of win-
ning is homogeneous of degree zero in force. We have three additional requirement
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for the relationship Ψ (.)
1. Anonymity (i.e. symmetry): For all S we require that Ψ (S) = 1−Ψ(1− S)
2. Force pays: Ψ′ (S) > 0.
3. No force implies a sure loss: Ψ (0) = 0.
It follows from the first requirement that Ψ′ (S) = Ψ′ (1− S) and Ψ′′ (S) =
−Ψ′′ (1− S) . Clearly, the much used Tullock contest success function, Ψ (S) = S,
is a special case of our set-up.5
How sensitive the winning probabilities are to relative force (spending) may
reflect institutional arrangements. In a pure unrestricted power struggle the Ψ-
function is more sensitive to changes in relative force than it would be with more
checks and balances. In elections, for instance, where the opposing blocks are not
allowed to buy political TV ads and instead have an equal share of time on public
television to present their political programs, the Ψ- function is rather flat around
S = 1/2.
Given the probability of winning Ψ (Sa) , when a is the incumbent and b is the
the challenger, the present value of the pay-offs (Va,t for incumbent a and vb,t for
challenger b) can be written as
Va,t=Ψ
Sa︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Ya/Ca
Ya/Ca + yb/cb
) Fa,t︷ ︸︸ ︷
[Da + δ (Va,t+1 − va,t+1)] + δva,t+1 − Ya,t (11)
vb,t=
[
1−Ψ
(
Ya/Ca
Ya/Ca + yb/cb
)] Fb,t︷ ︸︸ ︷
[Db + δ (Vb,t+1 − vb,t+1)] + δvb,t+1 − yb,t (12)
Here Y and y are incumbent’s and challenger’s costs while C and c are the unit
costs of force. Hence, if a is the incumbent and a wins, he obtains the prize Fa,t,
which is the utility difference Da, plus the excess present value from incumbency,
δ (Va,t+1 − va,t+1) . Whether he loses or not he has to pay the costs Ya. In addition
5See Skaperdas (1996) for a structured discussion of success functions.
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he always receives the discounted challenger pay-off δva,t. The expressions for Vb,t
and va,t follow symmetrically.
When a is incumbent, the first order conditions for the choice of efforts follows
from (11) and (12) as
∂Va
∂Ya
= 0 => Sa (1− Sa)FaΨ′ (Sa) = Ya (13)
∂vb
∂yb
= 0 => Sa (1− Sa)FbΨ′ (Sa) = yb (14)
The second order conditions can be written as
− 2
Sa
<
Ψ′′ (Sa)
Ψ′ (Sa)
<
2
1− Sa (15)
In addition, we impose participation constraints, assuring equilibrium in pure strate-
gies with positive expected return - i.e. that the net rate of returns are positive:
Ha ≡ Ψ(Sa)Fa − Ya > 0 and hb ≡ (1−Ψ(Sa))Fb − yb > 0 (16)
Using (2) it follows that in a Nash equilibrium where both (13) and (14) are satisfied,
then relative force is
Sa =
Fa/Ca
Fa/Ca + Fb/cb
(17)
and by symmetry when b is incumbent, the relative force is
Sb =
Fb/Cb
Fa/Ca + Fb/cb
(18)
Thus, each contestant’s prize relative to the unit cost of force determines the force
of the two sides. A contestant with either a high stake or a low cost has a high
equilibrium relative force.
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From (13) and (14) and from the symmetry of Ψ it follows that the net rate of
return Ha and hb both are determined by the following function h (.)
h (S) = Ψ (S)− S (1− S)Ψ′ (S) , ∂h (S)
∂S
> 0, h (0) = 0, h (1) = 1 (19)
such that
Ha≡ Ψ(Sa)Fa − Ya
Fa
= h (Sa) (20)
hb≡ [1−Ψ(Sa)]Fb − yb
Fb
= h (sb) = h (1− Sa) (21)
One illustration of the relationship between S, Ψ, and h is given in Figure 2. By
Figure 2: Relationship between S, Ψ(S), and h(S)
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definition the h function is below Ψ for all S. The h function reaches unity when
S is one, since the prize is then won with certainty and for free. The h function is
zero when S is zero since the prize cannot be won and no efforts are wasted.6
6In the case where the prizes are fixed and equal to Fa = Fb = F , the sum of h (S) and h (1− S)
is negatively associated with the social waste of the fight Ya + yb. Then we can define the total
waste ratio as total resources spent on the conflict relative to the prize. The waste ratio function
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We are now ready to prove the result anticipated in the previous section. By
differentiating (9), (10), (17), and (18), using (20) and (21) it follows that
dFi
Fi
=−SaSbδh′ (Si)
(
dCa
Ca
+
dCb
Cb
)
(22)
dSi=−S2aS2b δ(h′ (Si)− h′ (1− Si))
(
dCa
Ca
+
dCb
Cb
)
− SaSbdCi
Ci
(23)
Hence we have the following proposition
Proposition 1 Compared to the case without incumbency advantage an incumbency
edge to one contestant raises the prize to both sides of the struggle. The effects on
prizes are the same irrespective of who gets the incumbency advantage.
Proof. Follows from (22) when noting that incumbency advantage to one con-
testant implies that either dCa/Ca or dCb/Cb is negative.
An incumbency edge that favors one party only, makes the stakes higher for both.
The reason is that the prize of winning is high both when the pay-off of becoming
the incumbent is high and when the pay-off of becoming the challenger is low. The
winning contestant obtains the difference between these as part of the prize.
If the utility structure is not too uneven an incumbency advantage to one con-
testant may increase efforts by both at the same time as regime stability increases:
Proposition 2 If both sides are equally strong (Sa = Sb = 1/2) resource use goes up
for both sides in each fighting constellation while regime stability goes up as one side
gets an incumbency advantage. If one side (a) is particularly strong as incumbent
( Sa ≈ 1), resource use goes down for both sides as a gets a further incumbency
advantage while it goes up for both sides if b gets an incumbency advantage.
ω (S) is given by
ω (S) = 1− (h (S) + h (1− S)) = 2S (1− S)Ψ′ (S) > 0 when S ∈ 〈0, 1〉
When Ψ′′ is not too large, the waste ratio ω has its maximum at S = 1/2.
ω (Sa) has a local extrema when Ψ′′/Ψ′ = (2Sa − 1) /
(
Sa − S2a
)
.Given the symmetry of the
Ψ-function Sa = 1/2 obviously satisfies the first order condition and if Ψ is S-shaped (Ψ′′ < 0 to
the right of Sa = 1/2 i.e. a strong decreasing returns to effort) Sa = 1/2 is a unique and global
maximum. As it happens, the function Ψ (S) = 1/2−k/4 (ln (1− S)− ln (S)) (where Ψ′ (1/2) = k)
has exactly the curvature such that social waste is independent of S, as in this case ω (S) = k/2
for all S.
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Proof. When Sa = Sb = 1/2 it follows that Ψ
′′ = 0. It then follows from the
first order conditions (13) and (14) that
dYi
Yi
=
dyi
yi
=
dFi
Fi
Combined with the results from the previous proposition we know that resource use
goes up. That stability goes up follows directly from (23) as h′ (Si)−h′ (1− Si) = 0
when Sa = Sb = 1/2 .
With uneven positions these results are altered. When Sa → 1 it follows from (22)
and (23) that the F -s and the S-s are unaffected by a change in the C-s. It thus
follows from (17) and (18) that
dYa
Ya
=
dyb
yb
=
dCa
Ca
and
dYb
Yb
=
dya
ya
= −dCb
Cb
The proposition establishes that more fighting from both sides can go together
with higher regime stability. As both contestants raise their conflict spending equally
much, the probability of winning for the contestant that obtains the edge increases
and the average regime stability goes up. The main result is that an incumbency
edge to one group raises the stakes for both groups since it is equally important to
obtain the incumbency edge as it is to prevent the opponent from getting it. The
prize of winning goes up for both groups. For the incumbency group it goes up as
the pay-off of winning increases. For the challenger group it goes up as the pay-off
of losing declines. With higher stakes both fight harder either to win the edge for
future battles, or to prevent the opponent from winning it. As a result the amount
of resources wasted in the conflict increases. Hence, more unequal strengths may
imply that more resources are spoiled in the struggle even though the incumbent
who obtains the edge wins the battle more often than the challenger.
The result that an incumbency advantage raises the prize for both contestants
is not only a local phenomenon around Sa = Sb = 1/2. Let us define an absolute
13
incumbency advantage where the unit cost of force approaches zero. Clearly, when
a contestant with an absolute advantage becomes the incumbent, he stays forever.
When one contestant gets an absolute incumbency advantage we get the following
result:
Proposition 3 Compared to the case without incumbency advantage, the introduc-
tion of an absolute incumbency advantage to one contestant raises the prizes to both
sides, but most for the contestant who gets the advantage. In the limit case where
both groups have absolute advantage the valuation of incumbency is the same for
both sides and equal to 1/ (1− δ)Di.
Proof. Consider the case where a gets an absolute incumbency advantage (Ca →
0). It follows from (17) and (18) that Sa = 1 and Sb < 1. From (19) it in turn follows
that
h (Sa)− h (1− Sb) = 1− h (1− Sb) > h (Sb)− h (1− Sa) = h (Sb)
When both get absolute incumbency power (Ca → 0 and Cb → 0) It follows from
(17), (18) that Sa = Sb = 1 and that Ψ (Sa) = Ψ (Sb) = 1. From (19) it in turn
follows that
h (Sa)− h (1− Sb) = h (Sb)− h (1− Sa) = 1− 0
As long as only one contestant has an absolute incumbency advantage and he
remains the challenger, fighting is hard as the stakes are high for both.
We have shown that (i) introducing a minor incumbency advantage to one con-
testant, and (ii) introducing an absolute incumbency advantage to one side or both,
raises the prize for both sides in the conflict. But the prizes do not always increase
as the unit cost of influence decreases for one contestant. To see this consider the
simple case where Ca = Cb, Da = Db, and Ψ (S) = S: Then we can show that a
reduction in the cost of influence for a as incumbent would lower the prize to b if
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the discount factor is high enough, since
∂Fb
∂Ca
> 0 ⇐⇒ Ca = Cb < 2
√
δ/ (1 + δ)− 1 (24)
Therefore, if both parties have a strong incumbency advantage initially, a further
advantage for one group will lower the prize for the other. This result is a combina-
tion of two effects. First when both sides have strong incumbency advantages, the
challenger position is dismal for both. Hence, both va and vb are low and cannot
be much affected by a further reduction in the influence costs of the incumbents.
Now, if party a gets an even stronger incumbency advantage, implying that Ca goes
down, contestant a will fight harder as challenger, lowering Vb. If the future matters
sufficiently for party a (δ high) the value of Vb will go so much down that Fb also
declines. From condition (24) it is clear that δ > 1/3 is an absolute requirement for
this to be possible for any positive C.
2.2 Self-defeating power
Above we have seen that incumbency advantages can explain higher fighting efforts
and higher conflict spending for the contestants. It is even possible that the cost
associated with increased force makes the situation worse for the contestant who
improves his incumbency advantage. A strengthening of the incumbency advantage
for a present challenger may represent a serious threat for the present incumbent,
and the challenger could as a result be met with a much more heavy resistance. The
fact that the challenger actually may lose by getting the prospect of incumbency
advantage could make it optimal for a challenger to try to commit to abstaining
from using some of his incumbency power. More precisely:
Proposition 4 Power can be self-defeating: An incumbency advantage to a weak
contestant may induce so much fighting that the pay-off to the weak contestant goes
down.
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Proof. Consider a marginal incumbency advantage for a weak group a (Sa = sa
small). From (20), combined with the value functions (11) and (12) (where in the
latter a and b change places and where time subscripts are ignored), it follows that
(1− δ) dva
Fa
=h (Sa)
dFa
Fa
− h′ (Sa) dSb
dVa
Fa
− δdva
Fa
=h (Sa)
dFa
Fa
+ h′ (Sa) dSa
It follows by combining with (22) and (23) that
dva
Fa
=
δ
1− δh
′ (Sa)SaSb [(h′ (Sb)− h′ (Sa))SaSb − h (Sa)] dCa
Ca
dVa
Fa
=
dva
Fa
− h′ (Sa)SaSbdCa
Ca
Using (19) it follows that, when Sa is small
dva
Fa
≈ 2δ
1− δh
′ (Sa)S2aSbΨ
′ (0) > 0
dVa
Fa
≈ 1
1− δSaSbh
′ (Sa) [−1 + δ (2Ψ′ (0) + 1)] dCa
Ca
> 0when δ close to 1
< 0when δ close to 0
This result is in stark contrast to the result in static contests where the return
unambiguously goes up when costs go down. The intuition is simple enough. As a
challenger contestant a has no direct gain from his incumbency advantage. If the
incumbency advantage increases, the probability of becoming the incumbent may go
so much down that there is a net loss. This mechanism may even be the dominant
one for an incumbent. A weak incumbent a will know that the larger part of the
future periods will be played as challenger. The value Va will largely be determined
by va. Hence, if δ is large and Sa is low, an incumbency advantage that lowers va
may indeed also lower Va.
That a challenger may benefit from lowering his incumbency advantage has a
clear relevance for present power struggles. In Turkey for example, the Islamist
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party only won when it promised to respect the secular state and the democratic
principles. One way to interpret this is that it was seen less of a treat to the secular
elite (including the army) when it had promised to be moderate in its use of power
once in power.
3 Concluding remarks
Disparities play an essential role in lasting power struggles. They shape the dynamics
of the conflicts. A specific incumbency advantage implies that a victory today may
to some degree guarantee the victory also tomorrow, and as the expected outcome
today depends on who is the incumbent, the victory of tomorrow actually depends
on who was yesterday’s winner. The past thus affects present fighting efforts, which
again affects the future path of the struggle.
Thus the struggle between groups over the control of a country plays out dif-
ferently in countries where the control entails access to a strong state apparatus
compared to countries where the state apparatus is weak. In divided societies, a
strong state may fuel conflicts rather that mitigate them. Control of the state ap-
paratus makes the incumbent stronger, but a stronger incumbent makes the control
of the state apparatus more valuable. As a result the struggle for state control is
intense and the amount of resources wasted is high. Therefore, regimes may be
long lasting without deterring fighting by opposing groups. The attractiveness of
taking over a strong incumbency position may dominate the low odds of a short run
success.
The end of the cold war represented a dramatic shift in many internal conflicts
of the world. Many groups that had previously been supported by the East and the
West respectively, now were left to cater for themselves. As a result, the incumbency
advantage associated with international recognition and access to government re-
sources became relatively more important. Our analysis may explain why the many
civil wars continued with high intensity even after 1990. The reason could simply be
that victory became more important when a higher incumbency advantage became
17
part of the prize of winning.
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A Appendix Non-stationary solutions
In our analysis we have assumed that we are in a stationary Markov equilibrium
where (9) and (10) holds. In this section we will prove that there always exists at
least one stationary Markov equilibrium. We will also discuss the possibility of non-
stationary equilibria and the possibility of more than one stationary equilibrium.
A Markov equilibrium (not necessarily stationary) of the game is defined as time
paths of Fa and Fb such that (7) and (8) holds hence
Fa,t−1=Fa (Fa,t, Fb,t) ≡ Da + δ (h (Sa,t)− h (sa,t))Fa,t (25)
Fb,t−1=Fb (Fa,t, Fb,t) ≡ Db + δ (h (Sb,t)− h (sb,t))Fb,t
where
Sa,t =
Fa,tcb
Fa,tcb + Fb,tCa
and Sb,t =
Fb,tca
Fb,tca + Fa,tCb
(26)
A fix point of the system (25) is defined as (F ∗∗a , F
∗∗
b ) such that
F ∗∗a = Fa (F
∗∗
a , F
∗∗
b ) and F
∗∗
b = Fb (F
∗∗
a , F
∗∗
b ) (27)
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In order to find the fix points we first find the fix point, F ∗a , for Fa given Fb and vice
versa such that
F ∗a =Fa (F
∗
a , Fb,t) (28)
F ∗b =Fb (Fa,t, F
∗
b )
From (19) it follows that
0 ≤ (h (Si)− h (si)) ≤ 1
therefore a fix point for Fi has to be larger than Di and less than Di/ (1− δ). From
(19), (15), (16) and (26) it follows that
∂Fi,t−1
∂Fi,t
= δ
((
hi +
∂h (Si,t)
∂Si,t
∂Si,t
∂Fi,t
Fi,t
)
−
(
hi +
∂h (si,t)
∂si,t
∂si,t
∂Fi,t
Fi,t
))
< 1
It therefore follows that (28) has unique solutions.
F ∗a ∈Ra ≡
[
Da,
Da
(1− δ)
]
F ∗b ∈Rb ≡
[
Db,
Db
(1− δ)
]
The combined problem (27) therefore always has at least one solution. Moreover,
all solutions are found within the rectangle Ra, Rb. A simple case is the one where
δ is low or ci ≈ Ci for both sides. Then F ∗i is close to Di, and F ∗a and F ∗b will only
cross once.
If there are strong incumbency advantages combined with a high discount factor
δ, however, the fix point curves may get sufficient curvature to generate multiple
stationary equilibria. One illustration of this possibility is provided in Figure (3) .
Here, the parameter configurations are symmetric (Ca = Cb  1 and Da = Db = 1).
We see that one of the equilibria is symmetric, reflecting a situation where each party
inherits the others behavior when they change status. The upper left equilibrium
is a case where group a (caused by a low Fa) takes on a more passive role as
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Figure 3: Fixpoints
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incumbent causing a low Fa. Group b however (caused by the high Fb) takes on a
more aggressive role as incumbent causing a high Fb. A similar skewed equilibrium
exists down and to the right. These three points all satisfy the conditions for a
stationary equilibrium.
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